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Newsletter #174 A call to resist illegitimate authority March 1985 
The Politics of Famine in Ethiopia 
JONATHAN B. TUCKER 
Despite extensive coverage of the 
Ethiopian famine in the media, few 
Americans are aware that the crisis, 
like earlier famines in Cambodia and 
Biafra, has its roots in war and politics 
as well as drought. 
The northern provinces of Tigre and 
Eritrea, which have been worst hit by 
the famine, have also been embroiled 
for many years in armed struggles 
against the central government in 
Addis Ababa. As many as 3.8 million 
Tigreans and 2 million Eritreans are in 
danger of starvation, yet the ongoing 
civil wars have cut off the vast majority 
of these victims from aid programs run 
by the Ethiopian government and the 
international aid agencies operating 
under its auspices. "Because of the 
fighting, very little of the food con-
tributed by the United States and other 
donor countries is reaching the starving 
in the rebel-controlled areas," says 
Dan Connell, a former Reuters cor-
respondent in Ethiopia and now ex-
ecutive director of Grassroots Interna-
tional, a relief agency based in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts. 
Although Connell is one of the few 
people involved who will talk about it, 
it is an open secret among relief 
workers that more than half the famine 
victims in Ethiopia are not being 
reached by the government's pro-
grams. Ethipia's ruling military junta, 
Hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans migrate to Sudan in search of food and security. 
led by Lieut. Col. Mengistu Haile 
Mariam, is covering up the fact, and 
foreign diplomats and relief agency of-
ficials have been reluctant to reveal it 
for fear the government will curtail 
their operations altogether. Even more 
disturbing, there is strong evidence that 
the government has deliberately with-
held food from rebel-controlled areas 
in Eritrea and Tigre in order to starve 
the insurgents into submission. 
Thousands of noncombatants there 
have died from hunger. 
Unfortunately, the United States is 
tacitly abetting this use of famine as a 
weapon. In an interview last March, 
Hunter Farnham, a senior official with 
the Agency for International Develop-
ment (A.I.D.), said that famine victims 
in areas not controlled by the Ethio-
pian government are ''really over a 
barrel in terms of the U.S. being able 
to help them directly." He added, "I 
can tell you that we're quite concerned 
about this situation, and we'd like to 
be more responsive to the noncom-
batants who are really suffering the 
Continued on page Two 
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most.'' Although Farnham implied 
that the problem is a logistical one, it is 
political. The Reagan Administration 
is attempting to woo Ethiopia away 
from the Soviet Union, so it has been 
reluctant to provide direct aid to 
famine victimes living in rebel-
controlled areas. So far the United 
States has pledged 210,000 tons of 
food to Ethiopia, the largest amount of 
famine relief in our history. But 90 per-
cent of all international assistance to 
Ethiopia is being channeled to areas 
under government control and is thus 
subject to the junta's direction. 
Who are the insurgents and why are 
they fighting? Historically, Ethiopia's 
forty-odd ethnic groups have been op-
pressed by the Amhara tribe, which 
continues to control the central govern-
ment. Over the past decade, however, a 
number of armed resistance move-
ments have emerged. The Tigre Peo-
ple's Liberation Front (T.P.L.F.), 
established in 1975, seeks a decentraliz-
ed popular government to represent 
equally all the nationalities within 
Ethiopia. 
Although government troops occupy 
nine major towns in Tigre, the 
T.P.L.F. holds more than 85 percent 
of the rural areas. In the villages under 
its control, the front has organized 
People's Councils which have jm-
plemented land reform, built schools 
and clinics, and provided agricultural 
assistance and local security. Because 
of those tangible benefits, many 
peasants in rebel-held areas are sym-
pathetic to the front. 
Civil conflict has also raged for more 
than two decades in the Pennsylvania-
size territory of Eritrea, which is 
coveted by otherwise landlocked 
Ethiopia for its coast along the Red 
Sea. Ever since Emperor Haile 
Selassie's annexationof Eritrea in 1962, 
an independence movement has fought 
against successive regimes in Addis 
Ababa, but after twenty-three years the 
conflict remains stalemated. Today, 
the Eritrean People's Liberation Front 
(E.P.L.F.) occupies about 85 percent 
of the province outside the major 
cities, and it has established extensive 
administrative structures in the areas 
under its control. Although massive 
government offensives have hurled the 
rebels back temporarily, the army has 
failed to occupy the countryside. 
After a coup ended Haile Selassie's 
forty-four-year reign, in September 
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1974, a Marxist junta known as the 
Derg ("committee") took power, and 
following a bloody power struggle, 
Colonel Mengistu became its supreme 
leader. Because of the Derg's human 
rights violations and communist lean-
ings, U .S.-Ethiopian relations became 
increasingly strained, and in 1977 the 
Soviet Union replaced the United 
States as Ethiopia's superpower ally 
and · weapons supplier. Since then, the 
Russians have provided the Derg an 
estimated $2.5 billion in sophisticated 
weaponry (including MI-24 helicopter 
gunships and MIG-23 fighter-
bombers), along with some 1,400 
military advisors, and Cuba has sup-
plied 3,000 troops. 
Today, nearly half Ethiopia's na-
tional budget goes to support a highly 
mechanized army of 306,000 troops, 
one of the largest military 
establishments in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The civil wars in Eritrea and Tigre are 
costing the Derg approximately 
$500,000 a day, according to The New 
York Times, yet despite the huge in-
vestment of blood and treasure, victory 
has remained elusive. 
A series of military setbacks have led 
the Derg to resort to increasingly brutal 
forms of warfare, including scorched-
earth tactics. In the spring of 1983, the 
Ethiopian Army launched major of-
fensives in Eritrea and Tigre which left 
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massive destruction in their wake. Ac-
cording to Gayle Smith, a freelance 
journalist who toured Tigre on foot 
that year, the Ethiopian government 
deliberately sought to bring about a 
famine in the north as a way of 
weakening the rebels. "The 1983 of-
fensive was launched in western Tigre 
- the only part of the province where 
a grain surplus was achieved - and it 
occured right after the harvest,'' Smith 
says. "You can draw your own conclu-
sions." 
Government forces burned grain 
supplies, fields a11d pasturelands using 
incendiary bombs, cut down fruit or-
chards, shot domestic animals and 
destroyed public schools and health 
clinics built by the T.P.L.F. A similar 
military offensive in Eritrea con-
tributed to the famine there by disrup-
ting planting in the southwestern part 
of the territory bordering the Sudan. 
The Ethiopian Air Force also bombed 
towns and villages on market days, ter-
rorizing the inhabitants. "It's basically 
the old strategic-hamlet theory'' Grass-
roots International's Connell says, 
drawing a parallel to U.S. counterin-
surgency methods in Vietnam. "The 
government used terror attacks and 
hunger to drive the peope out of the 
countryside and into official reception 
centers in the main towns, which are 
held by Ethiopian government forces. 
March 1985 
The goal is not so much to control the 
peasants as to deny aid to the guer-
rillas." 
Evidence has emerged recently that 
the Ethiopian government is also diver-
ting emergency food to the army and 
militia. In October the government-
held town of Lalibela was overrun in a 
T.P.L.F.-led attack. According to 
three Western relief workers there, the 
rebels discovered large quantities of in-
ternational food aid inside a govern-
ment garrison. 
The deteriorating security situation, 
combined with communications and 
transportation problems, have meant 
that large areas of Eritrea and Tigre are 
cut off from famine-relief efforts. Dur-
ing last spring and summer the key 
roads to the north were often im-
passable because of fighting. Only a 
few food convoys got through, accom-
panied by armed escorts. Moreover, 
voluntary agencies working under the 
auspices of the Ethiopian 
government's Relief and Rehabilita-
tion Commission (R.R.C.) can 
distribute food only in official centers 
set up in the vicinity of government-
controlled garrison towns, such as 
Mekele, the capital of Tigre. 
"It's very difficult to reach the rural 
areas through the regular channels," 
admits James Deharpporte of Catholic 
Relief Services, which is working in 
Eritrea and Tigre in cooperation with 
the R.R.C. "The famine and the war 
situation have caused people to come 
to the urban areas where we have set up 
feeding centers, and they are the major 
beneficiaries.'' 
The only organizations providing 
direct aid to famine victims in rural 
areas of Eritrea and Tigre are two in-
digenous groups affiliated with the 
rebels. The Eritrean Relief Association 
(ERA) coordinates its activities with 
the E.P.L.F. but is administered in-
dependently; the association's officials 
say they provide food to all people in 
need regardless of whether they sup-
port the guerrillas. So far, ERA has 
managed an effective but seriously 
underfinanced relief effort in behalf of 
the 2 million Eritreans in danger of 
starvation. 
Similarly, the Relief Society of Tigre 
(REST), a voluntary agency founded in 
1978, is the only humanitarian organi-
zation operating in the guerrilla-con-
trolled areas there. REST's administra-
tion and personnel are separate from 
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the T.P.L.F.'s, although REST of-
ficials cooperate with the front and 
with the People's Councils in the 
villages. 
According to Gayle Smith, ERA and 
REST ''are so efficient that they could 
be models for disaster relief anywhere 
in the world." The bulk of the food 
and supplies they allot is contributed 
by European church organizations and 
a handful of U.S. private voluntary 
agencies working through the Sudan, 
including Grassroots International, 
Lutheran World Relief (New York Ci-
ty), Mercy Corps International (Port-
land, Oregon), Direct Relief Interna-
tional (Sacramento, California), the 
Mennonite Central Committee 
(Akron, Pennsylvania) and, since 
November, Oxfam America (Boston). 
The U.S. government provides small 
amounts of indirect aid to ERA and 
REST through those private relief 
groups and the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross. But although the 
Ethiopian government reaches about 
half of the famine victims, and ERA 
and REST the other half, the rebel-
associated groups have far less food at 
their disposal. "International aid is 
running 20-to-l in favor of the govern-
ment," Smith says. Many donors have 
declined to work with ERA and REST 
for fear either that the Ethiopian gov-
ernment might restrict the donors' pro-
grams or that food given to the agen-
cies might end up feeding rebel 
soldiers. So far, however, there is no 
evidence that food aid from ERA or 
REST has been diverted to the fronts. 
Because the amounts of food and 
supplies reaching the two organizations 
have been so small, famine victims in 
remote villages of Eritrea and Tigre 
must travel to feeding centers in the 
government-controlled towns. Those 
who survive the journey are often bad-
ly treated, according to Chris Cartter, 
associate director of Grassroots Inter-
national, who toured the · 
T.P.L.F.-controlled areas of Tigre in 
November and interviewed a number 
of migrating famine victims. He heard 
accounts of intimidation, harassment 
and even physical violence suffered at 
the hands of Ethiopian officials. 
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''Several refugees told me that officials 
in the government feeding centers 
asked them for an I.D. card, such as 
membership in a farmers' union,'' he 
says. "Because people from the 
T.P.L.F.-controlled areas don't have 
I.D.s, they were told to go to the back 
of the line or to come back the next 
day. Some were denied food and even 
beaten.'' 
Another source of the refugees' fear 
and mistrust of the official famine-
relief program is a new government 
policy. In November, the Derg began 
implementing wat it called "a long-
term solution'' to the famine, which 
consists of resettling peasants from 
Eritrea and Tigre to areas that are sup-
posedly more fertile in the southern 
provinces of Welega and Ilubabor. 
More than 70,000 people from Tigre 
have been moved to the south in 
trucks, buses and Soviet Antonov 
transport aircraft, and the Ethiopian 
government plans to resettle a total of 
1.5 million people there by the end of 
the year. In many cases, peasants have 
been removed from their ancestral 
lands against their will. According to a 
recent report in The Christian Science 
Monitor, villages in Tigre have been 
surrounded by troops at night and their 
inhabitants herded into trucks which 
take them to the new settlements. 
Mistreatment in the feeding centers 
and forced resettlement policies, 
together with ERA and REST's inabili-
ty to provide enough food, have led to 
a massive exodus from the rebel-held 
areas. Cartter reports that starving 
peasants are leaving their vilalges at a 
rate of 10,000 a week for the refugee 
camps across the Sudanese border. 
New arrivals at the border number 
around 120,000, and some 60,000 
migrants are making their way through 
Western Tigre. Although REST has set 
up dozens of checkpoints along the 
route to provide the refugees with 
food, water and basic medical care, 
thousands have died. 
Meanwhile, the fighting has inten-
sified in Eritrea and Tigre. Cartter, 
who witnessed a fire fight between 
rebels and government forces near the 
Tigrean town of Aresa in late 
November, notes that 50,000 troops 
have been aclded to the Ethiopian Ar-
my as a result of the junta's new policy 
of conscription. According to the vice 
chairman of the T.P.L.F., the front ex-
pects a major government offensive in 
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the near future and views the Derg's 
resettlement plan as part of a strategy 
to depopulate Eritrea and Tigre so as 
to further weaken the insurgents. 
On December 3, Ethiopian govern-
ment aircraft strafed the Tigrean town 
of Shellalo, killing eighteen people and 
wounding fifty-six. ''Shellalo lies on 
the road to Kassala, the principal 
migration route out of Tigre and the 
only food lifeline into the province,'' 
Cartter says. "If the Ethiopian govern-
ment seals off the road to Kassala, it 
will mean certain death for hundreds 
of thousands of people within weeks.'' 
Officially, the United States 
allocates food aid according to need, 
regardless of the political orientation 
of the recipient country. "A hungry 
child knows no politics," A.I.D. ad-
ministrator M. Peter McPherson said 
recently. But critics contend that U.S. 
emergency food aid has in fact been 
heavily influenced by political con-
siderations, with disproportionate 
amounts of aid going to countries that 
are either of strategic value to the 
United States or that align themselves 
with U.S. interests. 
Because of Ethiopia's strategic loca-
tion on the Horn of Africa, within strik-
ing distance of the Red Sea and the 
Persian Gulf, it has long been a focus 
of geopolitical rivaly between the 
superpowers. Under Haile Selassie, the 
United States had access to the 
Eritrean Red Sea coast and maintained 
an important electronic listening post 
at Kagnew Communications Station in 
Asmara, the capital of Eritrea. Thus, 
ever since the Carter Administration 
"lost" Ethiopia to the Russians, the 
U.S. government has sought by various 
means to lure the Derg back into the 
Western camp. Now the Reagan Ad-
ministration is employing emergency 
relief as a carrot and stick to achieve its 
foreign-policy objectives. . 
The Soviet Union has established a 
naval anchorage on Eritrea's Dahlak 
Archipelago and is reportedly install-
ing a missle facility in the area. Those 
moves have aroused concern in Wash-
ington about a new strategic threat on 
the Horn. The famine has also 
strengthened the Ethiopian govern-
ment's military position vis-a-vis the 
insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigre, 
possibly opening the way for conquest 
of the rebel-held territories. Such a 
development would represent a major 
strategic advance for the Soviet Union. 
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Although the Administration began 
sending emergency food aid to 
Ethiopia in 1983, the quantities were 
inadequate to the magnitude of the 
famine. Not until October 23, when a 
graphic BBC film of the famine was 
broadcast on the NBC Nightly News, 
was the American public alerted to the 
vast human tragedy under way. The 
shocking images of suffering and death 
triggered an outpouring of public con-
cern and forced the Reagan Admini-
stration to expand its aid program 
sharply. Yet a plea for increased aid 
had been made by R.R.C. commis-
sioner Dawit Wolde Giorgis in March, 
six months earlier. Those months of 
delay contributed to an untold number 
of deaths. 
The Rev. Charles Elliot, a British 
relief official, recently charged that the· 
United States and Britain had inten-
tionally delayed large-scale relief 
assistance to Ethiopia in the belief that 
widespread famine would trigger the 
overthrow of the Derg and bring a oro-
Western regime to power. (Indeed, a 
major cause of the coup that ousted 
Haile Selassie was the Emperor's 
cover-up of the severe famine of 
1972-73 in which more than 200,000 
people died. Apparently he had felt 
that a request for emergency relief 
would tarnish his international 
prestige.) But the current famine has 
had the opposite effect, helping 
Mengistu tighten his grip on power and 
strengthening his ideological ties with 
Moscow. On September 12, the Derg 
celebrated its tenth anniversary with a 
$100 million gala and announced the 
formation of an official state Com-
munist Party. 
Despite the strength of Ethiopian-
Soviet ties, U.S. policy-makers believe 
that Ethiopia - like Egypt, the Sudan 
and Somalia - can be induced by large 
amounts of Western aid to change its 
political orientation. They contend 
that the expanded relief effort repre-
sents ''a theat to Soviet hegemony over 
Ethiopia,'' Time reported in its 
November 26 issue. 
On November 2, the Administration 
announced that instead of channeling 
all famine aid through third parties 
such as voluntary organizations and 
U .N. agencies, it would send it directly 
to the Ethiopian R.R.C. The Reagan 
Administration also launched a pro-
poganda offensive. A.I.D. administer 
McPherson compared the United 
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Entire villages congregate under trees during the day to prepare food out of sight of MIG fighter planes. 
States' generosity with the Soviet 
Union's meager shipments of food aid 
and "callous indifference" to the 
plight of its ally. McPherson's 
righteous indigntion might have been 
more appropriate if the United States 
had been less tardy and more balanced 
in its reponse to the crisis. In any event, 
it was a transparent gesture of 
salesmanship. 
Because of the Administration's 
desire to improve relations with the 
Derg and eventually to displace the 
Russians, it has been reluctant to pro-
vide large amounts of aid to ERA and 
REST or to condemn the Derg's ruth-
less military tactics against rebel-held 
areas of Eritrea and Tigre. The United 
States has little incentive to support the 
movements for self-determination 
there, since the geopolitical prize it 
covets is a united Ethiopian Empire 
with its Eritrean coast intact; a 
dismembered weakened Ethiopia 
would be of little strategic value to 
either superpower. 
To date, Ethiopia has shown few 
signs of responding to America's 
courtship. Last month R.R.C. com-
missioner Giorgis attacked the United 
States for its belated response to the 
famine. His remarks drew an angry 
retort from McPherson, who termed 
the accusation ''a classic example of 
biting the hand that feeds you." The 
Reagan Administration may now be 
hedging its bets - continuing to pro-
vide limited aid to ERA and REST in 
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order to apply pressure on the Derg. 
Another important variable in the 
complex political equation is the 
stability of the Sudan, America's closet 
ally in the Horn. The regime of Presi-
dent Mohammed Gaafar el-Nimeiry is 
shaky, and the country is beset by 
severe drought, a renewed civil war in 
the south, severe tensions with 
Ethiopia and the burden of some 
700,000 refugees. The influx of an ad-
ditional 500,000 to 1 million refugees 
from Eritrea and Tigre could well 
destabilize the Sudan, creating another 
opening for Soviet gains in the region. 
If the United Staes wishes .to stem the 
massive exodus from Ethiopia, it must 
provide more food aid to Eritrea and 
Tigre. 
Geopolitical considerations aside, as 
a first step toward alleviating the enor-
mous human suffering in the two rebel-
controlled provinces, all donor govern-
ments should send more aid to ERA 
and REST. "I would never tell the 
U.S. not to give famine assistance to 
the Ethiopian government,'' says Dan 
Connell, "But if it's really 
humanitarian aid, you have to work 
where the victims are, and that includes 
rebel-controlled areas.'' Most urgently 
needed are trucks to deliver food that 
has already arrived. REST has forty 
trucks, with which it can transport only 
1,000 tons of food a month; in order to 
meet the need, hundreds more are re-
quired. 
Even with increased relief, however, 
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the suffering in Eritrea and Tigre can-
not be dealt with until the fighting 
stops. One million people in central 
Tigre are so weak from hunger that 
they are unable to migrate to the 
Sudan. They have sold their seeds, 
tools and oxen, and have no means of 
production. Unless relief aid can reach 
them, most will die. 
Several aid agencies have proposed 
an .internationally supervised cease-fire 
that would permit large shipments of 
grain, medicine and relief supplies 
across political and military boun-
daries, including emergency airlifts of 
food and supplies into the rebel-held 
zones. Although guerrilla leaders in 
both territories have offered to 
negotiate a cease-fire, the Ethiopian 
government has refused. R.R.C. com-
missioner Giorgis told The Washington 
Post recently, ''Ethiopia will 
never ... make a deal with terrorists 
and secessionists." 
Thus it will take an international 
outcry to pressure the Derg to permit 
aid to reach the forgotten people of 
Eritrea and Tigre. ''The Ethiopian 
famine has become caught up in global 
politics and can only be solved at that 
level," Cartter says. "If something is 
not done soon, a lot of people will have 
blood on their hands.'' 
Jonathan Tucker is a Boston-based 
journalist. This article was reprinted 
with permission from The Nation. 
JOB OPENING AT RESIST 
We're looking for a full-time office 
manager/coordinator who will coordi-
nate our grants program, help write 
and edit the newsletter and assist in de-
veloping fundraising efforts. Require-
ments include demonstrated experience 
working with grassroots organizations, 
proven communications and writing 
skills, as well as typing ability, famili-
arity with bookkeeping and, of course, 
a strong commitment to anti-racist, 
feminist and anti-militarist politics. 
Salary will be $14,000/year plus health 
insurance and 3 weeks paid vacation. 
We're asking for at least a two year 
commitment starting in May 1985. 
For those interested, send a cover 
letter, resume and writing sample to 
Resist by April 8th. 
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Witnessing the Famine: 
An Interview with Chris Cartier of Grassroots International 
In November of 1984, Chris Cartter, 
an associate director of Grassroots In-
ternational, a Boston-based relief 
agency, toured the rebel-controlled 
provinces of Tigray and Eritrea, the 
areas most affected by the current f am-
ine. Leading a Boston Globe reporter 
and photographer and an NBC-TV 
crew, Cartier and his entourage were 
the first westerners to witness and doc-
ument the massive famine in these 
areas. The foil owing excerpts, taken 
from an interview with Cartier con-
ducted by Meredith Smith and Ken 
Tangvik of the Resist staff, is meant to 
complement the article presented in 
this issue on The Politics of Famine in 
Ethiopia, which should be read first. 
Grassroots International has receiv-
ed grants from Resist in the past for its 
educational projects. For more inf or-
mation contact Grassroots Interna-
tional, Box 312, Cambridge, MA 
02139. 
Before going into Eritrea and Tigray 
I had heard from the Sudanese that 
people were crossing the border at the 
rate of 500 per day. But the Sudanese 
heard in reports from Tigray that there 
were going to be one quarter to one 
half million new refugees within a few 
months. The figures didn't make sense 
because the flow of refugees at the time 
was not nearly that great. When I left 
on the trip, though, the story of the 
famine was breaking so fast that even 
the Tigrayans I talked to in Khartoum 
and in Kassala, couldn't explain to me 
what I was going to see because they 
didn't know it themselves. 
Western Tigray has long been the 
bread basket of the entire northern re-
gion of Ethiopia - a very strategic 
area. In fact, the Ethiopian govern-
ment, over the years, has transformed 
some of the food production into ex-
port crops. The TPLF which now con-
trols most of this region, has instituted 
land reforms and developed very good 
relations with the small and medium-
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Food convoys operated by REST move through rebel-held areas in Tigray guarded by members of the 
TPLF. 
sized farmers in the area. Even though 
it has been hit by drought, there is still 
a surplus of food here. Tigray has his-
torically been an area that people have 
migrated to during hard times. The 
drought has been going on for a num-
ber of years and over the past few years 
there has been a migration into western 
Tigray. Last year alone 200,000 people 
migrated and were resettled in the area. 
In the middle of last year they met their 
saturation point and began to send 
people into Sudan. 
Last summer things began to ex-
plode. In mid August (1984) REST 
realized what was coming. There were 
massive crop failures, 95 OJo in eastern 
Tigray and 900Jo in central Tigray due 
to drought and also infestation of what 
they call army worms. There were 600Jo 
losses in western Tigray. REST sent 
out people to all the corners of Tigray 
to do a quick survey. In September 
they came out with a policy which they 
implemented on the 1st of October. 
They pulled back and consolidated 
their relief efforts to western Tigray be-
cause they had so little food to distrib-
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ute and they stopped moving food into 
central Tigray which had previously 
been a component of their activities. 
At that point, people were given two 
choices: to go into a government-
controlled town for food, or if they 
couldn't get food in a government 
town, or didn't want to, REST would 
manage their migration to Sudan 
where hopefully, by the grace of God 
and Allah, the world international 
community would take care of them 
(this happened in mid-October which 
was when the world attention focused 
on the situation). 
The situation in the government 
towns is not good. Migrants are com-
ing out of the rural areas. They are 
crossing the battle lines, the political 
and military lines, in search of food. I 
interviewed as many of the migrants as 
I could in this region to try to piece to-
gether what had happened to them. 
Clearly, thousands of people have 
crossed into the cities and have gotten 
food. People are getting fed but there's 
not enough food in these towns to feed 
all the people that are there. 
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Some people are being asked to pro-
duce farmers association cards. Farm-
ers associations are Ethiopian govern-
ment institutions so, of course, the 
people from Tigray didn't have them. 
The argument of the government and 
many relief workers is that identifica-
ion is needed to avoid double counting. 
That, in part, is true, but it's also an 
obvious tactic, which we saw in Viet-
nam - to figure out what side of the 
conflict people are on. And several 
things happen once that determination 
is made. People got food, but there 
was generally harassment and delays. 
People got sent to the back of the line 
or told over and over to come back the 
next day. If a single man walked up 
they would ask him where his family 
was, where were his kids. They would 
tell him to bring his sons the next day, 
and that they wanted to see his sons 
before they gave him any food. In 
some instances, people were beaten by 
government authorities. 
The first wave of people in early Oc-
tober went into the cities taking their 
chances. A lot of them got food. Those 
who didn't or who were harassed went 
back to their villages and told the 
others that it was hopeless. Whole vil-
lages that were two or three hours from 
the nearest town packed up and walked 
four to eight weeks to Sudan. Many of 
them died along the way. 
There is also a resettlement program 
which is now fully under way. The 
Ethiopian government is airlifting peo-
ple out of the principal towns of 
Makele, Bati, Koreni and others, using 
Soviet carriers and helicopters, to take 
them to southwestern Ethiopia. Their 
stated goal is to resettle a million 
Tigrayans to areas they feel are more 
fertile. Even people who may have 
thought about going into town for 
food didn't because they knew that 
many of their relatives and friends 
were being resettled against their will. 
Many of these people refused to go 
anywhere near the cities, risking death 
to move to Sudan. 
The rate of migration is unbeliev-
able. There are two principal routes. 
They all converge in western Tigray. 
The total number of people moving in-
to western Tigray as of early December 
was 5,000 every day. 
On my trip into Tigray we left from 
Kassala, on the border with Sudan, in a 
food convoy of ten ten-ton Fiat trucks. 
We moved at night because of the 
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threat of aerial. bombardment by the 
Ethiopian military. We crossed over 
the border into Eritrea and then cut 
south to the road across the desert. 
Generally we traveled without mishap 
on the trip I was on, though there were 
several MIGs that flew overhead one 
day. And the convoy ahead of us had a 
skirmish with the "shifta" or bandits 
who are armed by the Ethiopians. 
The trip into Tigray was extraordi-
narily gruelling. The trucks run about 
ten kilometers an hour over roads 
which barely exist through desert and 
hills. Each convoy includes about 
10-15 trucks and is guarded by about 
50 fighters. 
During the day we would sit camou-
flaged under trees, sleeping, shooing 
away the flies and talking to people. 
The fighters would cook food and take 
good care of the others on the convoy. 
The fighters are also mobilized to re-
spond to any disaster. At one point 
during the trip the truck ahead of me, 
the lead truck carrying 25 fighters, 
stopped. It was late in the evening, just 
getting dark, and there was something 
rustling off to the right. There was a lot 
of thorn brush so we couldn't see very 
far. All the fighters except one, dove 
off the truck with their guns and ran in 
the direction of the noise. The woman 
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fighter, who was left on top of the 
truck, hauled out a huge machine gun, 
an automatic weapon. It all happened 
instantly. The rustling turned out to be 
a shepherd with a flock of goats, so 
there was no mishap. 
You tend to forget that you are in 
the middle of a war zone and that at-
tacks happen constantly throughout 
the region. And everywhere there was 
this intense sense of comradery, every-
one working together, everyone rally-
ing around what their lives meant at 
that point - which was saving their 
people. 
The first night in southwest Eritrea, 
we saw maybe 800 people walking in a 
group, villagers who had come from 
eastern and central Tigray and had 
walked many, many weeks to get to 
this point, many of them dying along 
the way. The next night a slightly larger 
group of about 1,000 passed us by. 
These were people in a very desperate 
situation. They were having to make a 
very agonizing decision about whether 
or not to abandon forty stragglers who 
had been slowing down the whole 
group. 
Every day as we got further and fur-
ther into Tigray, the horror got worse. 
Every day there would be more and 
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more people; hundreds of thousands of 
people who were barely alive; people 
who were dressed in rags. Many of the 
kids were naked. It's cold there at 
night; it dropped down into the forties 
at night and people didn't have any 
blankets or shelter. When people are 
already so weak, the temperature can 
really take its toll. 
Leaving Eritrea, we dropped down 
into western Tigray where REST has 
focused much of its relief activities. 
They've set up forty check points. At 
each point they supply food, water and 
medical services to the best of their 
ability. The idea is to keep people 
taken care of during the day so they 
can walk that night to the next check 
point. They are in the process solely of 
managing the migration and exodus of 
their own people out of the country. 
At one check point, Zela Zele, that I 
visited when we first got to western 
Tigray, there were 10,000 people. The 
area was rolling arid hills with thorn 
brush and patchy trees. Walking a cou-
ple of miles around, I saw thousands 
and thousands of people in the dried 
up stream beads. People were cooking 
and sleeping and scratching wells in the 
stream beds. The water at that point 
was about two or three feet down. 
REST supplies food and medical care 
to all these people in a very organized 
fashion. They operate wells and clinics 
at all the check points. 
I was surprised at how calm and or-
ganized the operation was when I first 
got into western Tigray. The level of 
organization was incredible and there 
wasn't any chaotic activity. There 
wasn't any clamoring after and fight-
ing for places in trucks. All the empty 
grain trucks ran out with 7 5 people on 
each one of them. They tried to screen 
all the sickest people and put them on a 
truck for a ride out. 
Because the rate of migration was in-
creasing rapidly, REST had gone be-
yond its own capacity to feed people in 
this area. They could feed about 50,000 
to 80,000 at one time. That's about 
where they were at the time I was there, 
but the migration was starting to out-
pace their relief effort. On the way out 
I saw the effect of that. 
The organization started to break 
down, and the calm also. Even though 
people were desperate, it wasn't out of 
control until we started going out. We 
were already one day out and all the 
trucks were filled with people. We 
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spent one night at one of the transit 
camps where there were about 7,000 
people. The decision was made to take 
some of the healthier people out of the 
trucks to make room for some of the 
very sick people who were in the camp. 
So basically there was a new seating ar-
rangement. The scene in the dusk was 
just maddening. People were clawing 
to get into those trucks. Kids were cry-
ing, mother were crying and tossing 
their kids onto the trucks. Old men 
were trying to climb on the back. As we 
drove off, I'll never forget this, some 
guy was carrying his kid and flung him-
self and his kid in front of the truck. 
We barely stopped in time. He was that 
desperate, knowing a ride on a truck 
meant a ticket out to what he thought 
was a prosperous situation in the 
Sudan. 
However, the situation in the Sudan 
is very grim. When I visited Zela Zele 
on the way out, there were 15,000 peo-
ple where five days earlier there had 
been 10,000. Crossing the border on 
the way back into Sudan, migrants 
were arriving at 1,200 per day, double 
the number of a few days earlier. 
No one disputes that the famine is 
the worst in Tigray and in southern Eri-
trea. There's a very serious area in the 
south called Sidamo and some in the 
Ogaden, but the bulk of the people at 
risk are in the areas of conflict. Once 
you understand something about the 
war and how destructive it's been, it's 
· not surprising to see that the famine is 
the worst there. I think we'll see a half 
million people arrive in the Sudan in 
the next few months. I think we'll see 
over a half million dead in Tigray 
alone. 
There's been heavy ground fighting 
in the region. This is the time of year 
for offensives. Both the EPLF and the 
TPLF fear that an offensive will soon 
be mounted by the government. The 
most worrisome thing that's· happened 
recently was on December 11th when 
there was a bombing and strafing of 
drought victims who were migrating to 
Sudan through a town called Shillalo in 
Eritrea. Eighteen people were wounded 
and 56 killed. Those reports have been 
corroborated by survivors who are now 
in camps in Sudan and have been inter-
viewed by the media. At the time of the 
bombing, the press viewed it as just an-
other bombing, of which there are 
many. The significance of it was that it 
took place in Shillalo in Eritrea which 
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lies on the principal migration route 
out and the only lifeline into this 
region. 
There are also Ethiopian ground 
forces in the area that could seal off the 
region. That would mean certain death 
to hundreds of thousands of people 
within weeks. None of the food would 
be able to get in and the people would 
be trapped. These people are living day 
to day and if REST misses one convoy, 
there's no food. If they miss one con-
voy, people will starve, thousands of 
people will starve. There's a convoy 
going in every three days and if one of 
them is blown up or delayed, even for a 
few days, it will be translated into lost 
lives. So the stakes are very high, they 
are very high. 
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